The US and Syria: Between strategic success and unfinished business



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Washington is facing a moment of rare strategic clarity in Syria, a country long synonymous with unending war and geopolitical entanglement. A fragile interim government in Syria is struggling for stabilization. The dilemma for the U.S. is how to choose its level of engagement there without engaging in new conflicts or letting adversarial forces gain ground.

This becomes particularly important for the Trump administration, as Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa announced a transitional government on March 30, appointing a diverse 23-member Cabinet — an illustration of his growing grip on power. Although past policy has oscillated between intervention and disengagement, the current situation requires a balanced approach between pragmatic diplomacy and enforcing critical red lines. The decisions Washington makes during this period will shape whether Syria develops into a functional state or backslides into instability.

Strategically, the U.S. has achieved major successes in the region. The military presence of Iran has been substantially debilitated. Hezbollah’s weapon supply chains have been interrupted and Russia’s control over Syrian politics has diminished. The  longstanding “ring of fire” which threatened Israel due to Iranian-backed militias no longer presents an urgent danger. 

These successes, however, do not translate to an automatic U.S. exit from Syria’s affairs. A hasty U.S. withdrawal, combined with rigid policy approaches, would create fertile conditions for its adversaries to regain power in the resulting vacuum. The situation demands careful consideration, because Syria will fall back into disorder from insufficient engagement, yet deep intervention could inversely disrupt the current political equilibrium.

The Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act of 2019 remains the subject of extensive discussion in Washington regarding its potential lifting. The sanctions imposed to condemn Bashar al-Assad ‘s crimes have been unintentionally blocking Syria’s economic revival since the war ended. The U.S. should maintain its human rights enforcement yet Washington should adopt a dynamic approach by offering economic incentives for specific reforms to support Syria’s new government in establishing stability.

The U.S. policy must rest primarily on diplomatic relations. Washington has demonstrated its willingness to adjust policies through limited sanctions relief in January and it facilitated essential agreements between the interim government and Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces. These efforts should be expanded. The good thing is that there has been some positive development in this regard.

As per credible media reports, the U.S. has presented Syria with a set of conditions for partial sanctions relief, including a firm demand that no foreign nationals hold senior positions in the government. 

Natasha Franceschi, U.S. deputy assistant secretary for the Levant and Syria, personally conveyed these terms to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani during a sideline meeting at the Syria donor conference in Brussels on March 18. This marks the first high-level direct engagement between Washington and Damascus since President Donald Trump assumed office on Jan. 20, underscoring a potential shift in U.S. policy toward Syria.

The U.S. should maintain direct contact with Syrian leadership to influence its post-conflict decisions toward protecting minority populations and security sector transformation and economic growth. Engaging does not mean endorsing — it means having a seat at the table. Ignoring Syria’s new leadership outright by the international community would allow regional powers to dictate the country’s future on their own terms.

The transition government must protect Syria from becoming a haven for war criminals while implementing transitional justice processes and achieving credible judicial outcomes for recent events including the Latakia massacres. The credibility of Syria’s interim government will rapidly decline both domestically and internationally if it does not demonstrate authentic dedication to these principles.

The U.S. also faces a difficult decision regarding whether or not to engage with the rebel faction that led the successful overthrow of the Assad regime. Designated as a terrorist organization because of its al-Qaeda ties, it now operates as the governing force across extensive Syrian territories under al-Sharaa’s leadership.

There is also a geopolitical dimension to Syria’s reintegration. Some analysts argue that Damascus should pursue normalization with Israel under the framework of the Abraham Accords, a move that could accelerate its economic recovery and diplomatic legitimacy. But this depends upon the situation in Gaza and the West Bank. The continuing war between Israel and Palestinians may make such a scenario untenable. 

The path out of permanent economic isolation will require Syria to develop connections with countries that extend beyond its traditional allies Russia and Iran. The U.S. should explore creative diplomatic incentives that encourage Syria’s integration into a broader Middle Eastern framework — whether through economic partnerships, counterterrorism cooperation or regional security arrangements.

Acting with this in mind, the U.S. must secure its current successes in Syria while stopping the country from descending into a failed state. The U.S. must avoid the worst-case situation where Syria limps on a fragmented territory lacking effective government while being controlled by foreign interests. It must also reject the false choice between full recognition of Syria’s interim government and complete disengagement. The U.S. must engage selectively, applying pressure where necessary and offering incentives where useful.

Washington has consistently operated with a reactive Middle Eastern policy that focuses on crisis response instead of proactive event formation. In Syria, the U.S. has an opportunity to transform its past reactive approach to balanced one, combining diplomatic relations with conditional economic aid and defined governance standards provides.

Imran Khalid is a physician and has a master’s degree in international relations.



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