As the Biden administration prepares to cede power, it will leave without accomplishing a much-discussed diplomatic goal: the normalization of ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a formal U.S. security guarantee to Riyadh. The deal has yet to materialize, even as rumors of a formal defense pact circulated in early 2024. Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed these discussions in congressional testimony.
The future of a formal U.S.-Saudi security agreement remains uncertain, though the Biden administration appears to now be pursuing a pact that would not involve a broader deal with Israel making concessions towards a Palestinian state. While the administration may want to expedite the deal so that it is complete before Jan. 20, it would be unwise to commit more American troops to a nation that shares little in common with the U.S. in terms of interests and values.
Hawkish organizations and analysts have proposed that closer and enhanced defense cooperation with Riyadh will “reduce the need for direct American intervention.” Experts tout a formal U.S.-Saudi defense pact as a possible deterrent against Iran, as well as an opportunity for America to force Saudi Arabia to cut ties with Beijing, impeding Riyadh from drifting into China’s sphere of influence.
However, a formal security agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia risks disrupting the balance of power in the Middle East and increasing Iran’s view of America as a threat.
As Jennifer Kavanagh of Defense Priorities recently argued, partnering with destabilizing actors such as Saudi Arabia will further entangle the U.S. in the Middle East. The U.S. has already contributed to a moral hazard by arming the Saudi Arabia-UAE coalition in its initial 2015 Operation Decisive Storm aerial bombing campaign on Yemen, thereby becoming complicit in killing thousands of civilians.
These engagements have intensified Yemen’s humanitarian crisis, as around three-quarters of its population lives in poverty. Rather than providing an opportunity for Washington to retrench from the region, furthering security cooperation with Riyadh would embolden the Saudi regime to continue regional destabilization.
Washington has paid a price for enabling Saudi recklessness. After Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries intervened in Yemen’s civil war after rebels seized the capital of Sanaa in 2015, the Yemeni Houthis were able to portray themselves as defenders of the Palestinian cause. The Houthis have since severely disrupted global trade, carrying out 130 attacks in the Red Sea between the start of the war in Gaza and Sept. 20, 2024. But although Saudi Arabia’s commercial interests are more affected by the disruptions in the Red Sea than America’s, the U.S. is doing the heavy lifting by involving itself militarily in strikes against the Houthis.
Saudi Arabia faces no threat to its sovereignty, as the Middle East lacks a true regional hegemon. Regional stability is one of Washington’s main rationales in its dealings with Riyadh. Yet Saudi Arabia has been involved in almost every conflict zone and geopolitical fault line throughout the Middle East. Additionally, weapons that were given to the Saudis have a history of ending up in adversaries’ hands, including al Qaeda and Iran. Moreover, corruption and a lack of transparency in Saudi defense institutions is a prevailing problem.
On top of the mismanagement of military aid, devoting equipment that Saudi Arabia would need to enhance its defense would detract from American interests in higher priority theaters, namely the Indo-Pacific. With the ongoing war in Ukraine and potential conflict with China over Taiwan, the U.S. military-industrial base, which is already facing constraints, would experience further strain. Although the extent of the strain is undisclosed, Washington’s missile inventory, both offensive and defensive, is dwindling. Avoiding confrontation with China through deterrence by providing asymmetric weapons to Taiwan, such as mobile air defense systems, should be the highest priority.
Fears that China will replace the U.S. as a security guarantor in the Middle East are unfounded. China has little to no ability to project power in the Middle East and is highly opposed to military intervention, alliances and establishing bases, given that U.S. misadventures in the region serve as cautionary tales. Beijing is more than happy to see America entrenched in what it views as a quagmire. China’s transactional approach to the region poses no threat to Washington’s limited actual interests in the Middle East.
Washington must be wary of tightening alliances in a region that should be its lowest priority. Prior interventions in the Middle East should guide the U.S. in its cost-benefit analysis of providing security to Saudi Arabia. A sober assessment of the U.S.-Saudi alliance would reveal that its costs to U.S. interests, values and priorities far exceed its strategic returns.
Alex Little is an MS graduate of Georgia Tech and specializes in Russian and Central Asian affairs. He is also a contributor with Young Voices.
