Donald Trump’s election victory was a clarifying moment. But in terms of Middle East policy, months on the campaign trail still left three key questions unanswered.
Will Trump recommit the U.S. to a policy of preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon?
American presidents have differed wildly in their Middle East policies over the past 15 years, but they all agreed on the principle that it was too dangerous to allow Iran’s messianic leaders to possess nuclear weapons. Presidents had different strategies to prevent this — from diplomacy (the Iran nuclear deal) to economic sanctions (“maximum pressure”) to military threats (“all options on the table”) — but the principle was constant.
So far, however, the Trump-Vance campaign has not endorsed this approach. In the vice presidential debate, for example, Vance said he supported Israeli action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, but neither he nor Trump have said whether stopping Iran from going nuclear was an American responsibility.
This is a foundational question. The difference between committing the U.S. to preventing Iran from achieving a nuclear weapon or sliding into a de facto policy of containment — doing our best to convince, cajole or coerce Iran not to use its capability — is profound. Virtually everything the Trump administration tries to accomplish in the Middle East will flow from how it answers this question.
Will Trump continue substantial U.S. military deployments in the Middle East that facilitated robust defense cooperation between Israel and Arab states?
Trump, to his credit, brought Israel into U.S. Central Command during the waning days of his first term, which paved the way for a flowering of Arab-Israeli military cooperation during the Biden administration. The joint effort of Israel, Arab states and European partners to counter Iran’s unprecedented April 13 missile and drone attack on the Jewish State was a prime example. But the glue that held that cooperation together was active American military engagement, including the deployment of substantial U.S. air and naval assets to the Middle East.
Some Trump advisors oppose this sort of American military operation, either because they fear a slippery slope toward a Middle East war, or because such deployments distract from the more important task of countering Chinese aggression. But without the U.S. leading the way, Arabs and Israelis may not be ready to cooperate openly with each other.
The question for Trump is whether he will invest the necessary military assets to develop even deeper Arab-Israel defense partnerships or, alternatively, reduce America’s role and risk aborting regional cooperation that could eventually see Arabs and Israelis standing up to Iran on their own. The answer will determine whether we take advantage of a great opportunity to redraw the strategic map of the Middle East.
Will Trump support Israeli annexation of West Bank territory?
The Abraham Accords were the greatest diplomatic achievement of Trump’s first term, and expanding them is likely to be a key objective of his second. It bears remembering how the original breakthrough came about.
In spring 2020, when Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu threatened to annex major parts of the West Bank, the United Arab Emirates changed his calculus by conditioning its offer of an agreement for peace and normalization on Israel promising to suspend annexation for four years. Israel chose peace over territory, signed a historic deal midwifed by the Trump administration, and has since kept its word.
Those four years expired two months ago. Now, with an even farther-right coalition in power, Netanyahu may view Trump’s reelection as a chance to complete what he started in 2020, as his recent appointment of a vocal annexation advocate to be ambassador in Washington suggests.
Annexation of even part of the West Bank is a dramatic step that would mark a formal end to Israel’s post-1967 policy of portraying the territory as a potential bargaining chip in peace negotiations, a position Israel maintained even as it encouraged Jewish settlements. Regardless of one’s view of the justice of Israel’s claim to historic Judea and Samaria, it is clear that a decision to redraw Israel’s borders outside a diplomatic agreement with Palestinians would deepen a breach between Israel and its Arab treaty partners, between Israel and many Western democracies, and between Israel and a significant chunk of American, including Jewish American, public opinion — all when the Jewish State already faces attacks on multiple fronts.
Trump’s position on annexation is unclear. In 2020, he was cool to the idea. But he just nominated a strong supporter — former Arkansas Gov. Mike Huckabee (R) — as his ambassador to Israel.
Both Trump and Netanyahu may be counting on an Arab state — this time, Saudi Arabia — to solve the problem, the way the Emirates did in 2020. But Riyadh is likely to demand more for its deal from both Israel and America than Abu Dhabi did, including Israel’s agreement on a pathway to a Palestinian state and U.S. agreement on a mutual defense treaty. There is no guarantee than Trump and Netanyahu can meet Saudi demands. As a result, after having opened the door to annexation, Netanyahu may find himself unable to close it, even if he wants to.
To avert this situation, it will be important to know Trump’s position on annexation. Clarity does not make a Saudi version of the Abraham Accords any less likely; it only averts a potential diplomatic morass in case that deal cannot be reached. Indeed, if Trump’s position is to oppose annexation, Netanyahu can use that to quiet the idea’s enthusiasts in his coalition.
Taken together, answers to these questions — on commitment to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear bomb, on investment in Arab-Israel military cooperation and on American policy toward Israeli annexation of West Bank territory — will determine the direction of Middle East policy in the second Trump administration.
Robert Satloff is the Segal Executive Director of the Washington Institute.
